Prompt injection
Prompt injection exploits the weakness of language models in telling an instruction apart from the content they are processing. When a model reads an email, a document, a page, a ticket or a message, the attacker can put text into that content which reads like an instruction.
Term
description · examples · notesPrompt injection exploits the weakness of language models in telling an instruction apart from the content they are processing. When a model reads an email, a document, a page, a ticket or a message, the attacker can put text into that content which reads like an instruction.
Description
The direct variant is a user in conversation trying to make the model ignore its rules. The indirect variant is more dangerous: the malicious instruction sits hidden in a document, a web page or an email the agent reads. The victim often never sees the instruction, but the model will process it.
The damage depends on the permissions the agent holds. If it only answers, it can give away data it has access to. If it may send mail, call an API, change a ticket, read files or delete data, the attack is no longer a game with text but an operational incident.
Examples
- An agent summarizing email reads hidden instructions to forward the latest messages to an external address.
- A chatbot connected to a database receives a request to ignore its previous rules and print another user's data.
- A PDF tender contains hidden text that tries to change the conclusion of the assistant comparing the bids.
Notes
- With LLM agents the problem is not only what the model says but what the model is allowed to do.
- Before any debate about the perfect prompt, the permissions need narrowing, the data separating, and actions with consequences need a confirmation step.
Mentioned in the news
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- 1. MAJ 2026. OpenClaw ranjivosti omogućavaju zaobilaženje politika i krađu API kredencijala →
- 18. APR 2026. AI agenti na GitHub Actions ranjivi na prompt injection kroz komentare →
- 15. APR 2026. GitHub Copilot Chat propust pokazao kako prompt injection može da izvuče tajne podatke →
- 28. MAR 2026. Propust u Claude Chrome ekstenziji omogućavao zero-click prompt injection sa bilo kog sajta →
- 20. MAR 2026. ESET upozorava na bezbednosnu krizu u platformama za AI agente i njihove skill-ove →
- 19. MAR 2026. Lanac ranjivosti u Claude.ai omogućavao krađu podataka i zlonamerna preusmerenja →
- 14. MAR 2026. Ranjivosti u OpenClaw AI agentu mogu omogućiti prompt injection i krađu podataka →
- 27. FEB 2026. Istraživač demonstrirao jailbreak Claude AI modela →
- 24. FEB 2026. GitHub Issues zloupotrebljen u Copilot napadu koji vodi do preuzimanja repozitorijuma →
- 18. FEB 2026. Istraživači pokazali kako se Copilot i Grok mogu zloupotrebiti kroz prompt injection →
- 1. MAJ 2026. Kritična Gemini CLI ranjivost omogućava RCE u CI/CD tokovima →
- 20. APR 2026. Kritična slabost u Anthropic MCP otvara put do RCE napada →
- 19. APR 2026. AI vendori često prebacuju odgovornost za bezbednosne propuste na korisnike →
- 29. MAR 2026. Zlonamerne ekstenzije kradu AI razgovore u prompt poaching napadima →
- 28. MAR 2026. Palo Alto Networks širi platformu za otkrivanje i kontrolu AI agenata →
- 11. MAR 2026. OpenAI kupuje Promptfoo platformu za testiranje bezbednosti AI sistema →
- 11. MAR 2026. OpenClaw AI agent izazvao talas bezbednosnih incidenata nakon naglog rasta popularnosti →
Techniques
carried out with 2Techniques used to carry it out. Select one to open its page.
Defenses
countered by 5How it is defended against. Select one to open its page.