SCADA/OT Attack

Description

OT environments often carry older protocols, equipment that is hard to update, and a long service life. Much of it was designed for reliable operation, not for a hostile network. When IT and OT networks are joined for monitoring, remote access or efficiency, the attack surface grows.

In attacks like these the aim is not always theft. It can be a halt in production, a change of parameters, damage to equipment, pressure on the operators, or sabotage. OT security is therefore measured not by whether the data stays confidential but by whether the process stays safe.

Examples

• Through a compromised IT network the attacker reaches an engineering workstation and changes a PLC configuration.
• Remote access without MFA is used to get into a production monitoring system.
• Malware in an OT environment interrupts the HMI stations and makes it harder for operators to control the process.

Notes

• In OT, availability and the safety of the process are often more important than classic data confidentiality.
• A patch is not always possible straight away. That is why segmentation, monitoring and control of remote access carry far more weight.